REASONING BEHIND THE MODEL
How wealthy investors have been shown the same capital markets assumptions as nontaxable pools of capital has remained a puzzle over the years. As the stock market bubble grew in the late 199O's, so too did the gap between investor expectations and ultimate reality after they paid the tax bill. Conversely, municipal bonds have been largely viewed by investors as a conservative, low return investment.
In 2004 the Institute for Private Investors Family Performance Tracking Survey' revealed that wealthy investors maintained an exposure to municipal bonds of 9% of total assets. (In this discussion, we use high grade long municipal bonds represented by the Bond Buyer Index"* when referencing "bonds.") When investors were poUed, the most common answer given was that the rate one could earn on a municipal bond was inferior to the return one could earn on long equities or similar derivative instruments. Another study released by Northern Trust' in 2006 showed similar results, with polled investors reporting an average of 11% allocated to bonds. In addition, the Northern Trust survey found that over two thirds of the respondents were attitudinally oriented towards preserving their wealth over growing it further.
That begs the question, "Are the commonly used studies of historical asset class returns useflil to the high tax bracket investor?" Or put more simply, "Have stocks outperformed bonds over the long run for the high tax bracket investor?" In 2006, Ibbotson released a study on after-tax returns titled, "Stocks, Bonds, and Bills after Taxes".''' The study concluded that stocks experienced an 8.2% after-tax return compared to an after-tax return on government bonds of 3.5%. There were two problems with the Ibbotson study, limiting its usefulness to the high tax bracket investor. The study applied a tax rate based upon a 2005 income of $100,000, which only computed taxes at the middle tax bracket of 28% versus the top tax bracket at 35%. The other problem was that there were no adjustments made for the terminal value (post liquidation) ofthe portfolio. Hence, the aftertax returns were overstated because the embedded capital gain in the portfolio had not been taxed. However, a post liquidation analysis is only of interest for evaluating a portfolio whose basis would not benefit from a step-up at death, and in this scenario the resulting annualized return would be 8 basis points higher. Failing to fmd a study that answered the question with respect to the top tax bracket investors, we chose to undertake this study
We modeled a portfolio that began in 1961 and saw identical returns to the S&P 500 Index.^ The portfoho experienced 20% annual turnover, on which it paid long term capital gains tax at the highest rate. The model portfolio also received annual dividends, based on the dividend yield of the Index, on which it paid taxes at the highest rate. After growing for 44 years until 2004, each year mirroring the Index, less capital gain taxes, and receiving dividends, it annualized 6.72% (Exhibit 1) after liquidation.
We found a notable difference between reported returns on equities versus the return on investment after taxes. For the 44 years covered in our model, the annualized after-tax ROI for the S&P 500 was 6.72%, while the tax free portfolio saw a return of 10.62% (Exhibit 2). Why are the numbers so low? From 1960 to 1980, ordinary income taxes ranged from 71% to 91%. Add an average 6% state income tax rate and an investor effectively lost the majority of his return to taxes as most of the return in those two decades stemmed from dividends rather than capital gains.
One takeaway from the study \vas the effect annual turnover had on the portfolio. The model assumed 20%, but when adjusted from 0% to 100%, we saw a decrease in annualized performance from 7.86% to 6.14%. This says a lot about the investment strategy of an investor in the highest tax bracket and the effects of low turnover investing versus a strategy with high turnover.
During the same time period studied, the Long Term Municipal Bond Buyer Index had a straight line average return of 6.14%, compared to 6.72% with the S&P 500 Index, with much less volatility.
Many behavioral fmance studies suggest that equities may not produce higher returns than bonds, if investors do not maintain their holding period for full investment cycles. Our fmdings on after-tax returns combined with existing knowledge of the effects of behavioral fmance and inflation suggests that the traditional stock versus bond debate deserves to be revisited. An investor must determine what additional premium over bonds they require to compensate them for the risk. Furthermore, ultra high net worth investors must consider the impact capital gains and dividend tax will have on their taxable portfolios.
It would be wise for taxable investors to invest with tax adjusted investment assumptions. Failure to do so will cause the investors to overstate their investment return expectations and possibly overweight their equity allocations due to this misconception. Only investors educated on the tax-adjusted impact of a given strategy can make educated decisions as to return expectations and asset allocation. Our hope is that the presentation of this model will motivate investors to make more informed decisions.
Basic Model Description*
On January 1, 1961, an investor in the highest tax bracket invested $100 into a portfolio of stocks representing the S&P 500 Index. The dividend yield that year was 3.41% paid quarterly of 0.8525%. The Index rose 23.13%, and its assumed straight line growth over the year would have priced it at $105.78, $111.56, $117.34, and $123.13 at the end of each quarter. Dividend yield of 0.8525% on each of those exhibits gives $0.90, $0.95, $1.00, and $1.05 totaling $3.90. The dividend tax in 1960 was 91% and state tax, which can be adjusted in the model, was assumed to be an additional 6% so the $3.90 after taxes would be only $0.12.
During the year, there was a 20% portfolio turnover resulting in capital gains tax of $4.63 on market appreciation of $23.13. This was taxed at 25% federal and 6% state so at year end, $1.43 was owed in taxes. Combining the $100 original portfolio value plus the $23.13 in gains, less $1.43 for taxes and adding $0.12 more in dividends, the total portfolio at the end ofthe year is $121.81.
The retained dividends and turnover after taxes in the portfolio will then be reinvested which wiU add to the original $100 principal. The $4.63 in turnover, less taxes of $1.43, nets $3.19 (rounded) plus $0.12 in dividends. This means that the principal to begin the next year will be $100 + $3.19 + $0.12 = $103.31. The 20% turnover in the following year will now have to pay capital gains tax on any amount over that exhibit. Since we are only Portfolio turnover results in significant cost to the investor. We observed several possible ranges of portfolio turnover from 0-100% (Exhibit 3). Dr. Siegel estimates that the annual turnover rate on the S&P 500 since its inception is 5%.' Other studies estimate that the average turnover in an equity mutual fund is as high as 100%. We chose to use 20% as an assumed turnover rate, which we are confident reflects a reliable observation of large cap core portfolios. Our model allows for a turnover variance ranging from 0% to 100% to fit management styles. The difference in after-tax returns is notable. When the portfolio experienced 0% turnover, the terminal after-tax annualized rate of return for the period was 7.86%. On the other side of the spectrum, when the portfolio experienced 100% turnover, the rate of return dropped to 6.14%, equal to the average yield of the muni bond.
Municipal Bonds
One of the most compelling observations in our study was that the fully taxed S&P 500 Index portfolio posted an annual return after liquidation during the observed period of 6.72%, while the straight line average return on the bond buyer municipal bond index was 6.14%.'° The volatility (standard deviation) of the S&P 500 Index portfolio is assumed to be 14.3%," compared to that of the municipal bond, at 4.2%.'^ The investor should then be compensated for the additional risk, and over the period studied, that premium amounted to only 58 basis points. Surely, when viewing the terminal value of the equity portfolio, the incremental return equities earned over bonds was quite low.
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR HIGH NET WORTH INVESTORS?
Our findings should prove invaluable to taxable investors when making long-range estate planning decisions as well as estimating their expected total portfolio value. This information will also be useful in the asset allocation decisions with regard to expected 
Portfolio Turnover
For illustrative purposes only. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
returns. The same investor, who takes the additional risk of holding equities when the earned premium is 3.35% like an untaxed portfolio, may choose differently when after taxes, the premium is reduced to 0.58%. This article should also throw more light on the subject by cautioning high tax bracket investors from aligning themselves with the practices of non-taxable investors such as pension funds and endowments.
One obvious conclusion from this study could be that taxes matter a great deal to the ultra-high net worth investor. Along the same line, the observed equity premium earned by taxable investors is much smaller than their non-taxable peers. While untaxed equities in our study earned 3.35% excess return above the average on a 30 year U.S. treasury bond, the fully taxed portfolio net return was only 58 basis points over the average muni bond for the same period.
As the historical rates cannot be assumed to represent those of the future, we examine several possible scenarios by asking some questions:
• What happens to the returns if the 15% dividend and Capital Gains rate of today, were present during the whole period of 1961 to 2004? The after-tax annualized rate of return rises to 8.82%.
• What if the rates to be expected in 2008, after the sunset provisions, were applied over the entire period studied (capital gains tax of 20% and dividends taxed as ordinary income at 39.6%)? The average aftertax return of the portfolio becomes 7.68%; nearly 28% of the returns are lost compared to the 10.62% of an untaxed portfolio.
We cannot predict with certainty what tax bracket our portfolios will experience over the future. It is reasonable to observe that many industrialized nations stiU maintain high taxation practices. As we write this article, the highest income tax rates in the world are levied in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Israel, Netherlands, and Norway. These countries maintain top income tax brackets of around 50% or higher. Many have stated that the tax rates from the 60s, 70s, and 80s should be dismissed as a practice unlikely to recur in our lifetime. Such a dismissal may be premature.
What tax rate is prudent to use for long-term projections into the future? Predicting the future tax rates lies outside the domain of the authors, but we can make reasonable assumptions for planning purposes. The tax rates that took effect in 1994'^ seem to provide an adequate benchmark or middle ground. The 39.6% rate in 
Muni Bond -Bond Buyer CO 20-Year Bond Municipal Bond Index (straight-line weekly average from 1961-2004). Actual Rates -Tax rates observed over the period studied, collected from the United States Internal Revenue Service. 2008 Rates -Rates after the sunset provisions where Capital Cains will be taxed at 20% and Dividends taxed as earned income at 39.6% used throughout the entire period.
Lowest Rates -Tlie current tax rates, Capital Cains taxed at 15% and Dividends taxed at 15% throughout the entire period.
Untaxed -A portfolio where Capital Cains and Dividends were not taxed at either the federal or state level.
1994 closely approximates the average of the longest running tax rate (70%) and the lowest observed tax rate (15%). Applying the 1994 rates to the period produced a net ROI of 7.23%, we observed.
We conclude that there is indeed a larger margin of error on expected portfolio returns due to the erratic nature of the top tax bracket. Our study vindicates the view that a dominant allocation to Municipal Bonds may be prudent at times. As investors, we must ask ourselves, "How much more must we earn in equities versus Municipal Bonds after-tax to justify the risk?" Each one of us will respond differently. In 1982, when we observed an earnings yield of 14% on the S&P 500, equities, could be argued, were worth the added risk. But in 2000, when the yield on a Municipal Bond of 6% was nearly double the earnings yield on the S&P 500 of 3%, it became much more difficult to dismiss completely or underweigh Munis in our Asset Allocation.
The impact of this reahty holds major implications for families who will experience the top tax rates. If one of their infant grandchildren happens to be the beneficiary of a trust with a 40-year time horizon, the following stark differences will dictate the end portfolio value. If the trust today is $10 million, and it earns pretax historical return (observed in this study) over the 40 years, it grows to approximately $567 million. If, however, the trust must pay its own taxes and liquidate at the end of the term, the ending portfolio value shrinks to $135 million. We believe that a difference of $432 million would be considered significant to a grantor, trustee, or beneficiary of such a trust."
Gross Rates of Return
The exhibits reported in this study are gross of expenses such as transaction costs or investment advisory fees. In 1975, Jack Bogle presented the idea of creating 
CONCLUSION
From our study, we have observed:
• The after-tax returns on the S&P 500 index and those of municipal bonds"^ were similar over time for the high tax bracket investor.
• The high tax bracket investor gained little to no risk premium for investing in equities.
• Portfolio turnover has major implications on aftertax returns over time.
• Indexing was not an effective vehicle for producing excess return over bonds. • Taxes must be taken into account during planning, asset allocation, manager selection, and monitoring of investments.
In total, the study presents some clear implications for equity investing. While equities did not produce a substantial excess return over the last 44 years, today's low tax rates increase the margin of opportunity for doing so. Our recommendation is that investors develop an understanding of the impact of taxation's effect on equity returns and to incorporate this thinking into asset allocation and risk management of portfolios as the taxation landscape changes. 'Turnover rate on the S&P 500 is estimated to be between 4-5% since the inception of the index. Jeremy Siegel referenced this point in his 2006 paper titled, "Long-Term Returns on the Original S&P500 Companies".
ENDNOTES
'"Bond Buyer GO 20-Year Bond Municipal Bond Index (straight-line weekly average from .
"S&P500 earnings and dividends: www.pages.stern.nyu. edu/~adamodar.
'^Lehman Brothers Municipal Index. '^Citizens for Tax Justice, May 2004 and www.home. att.net/-resurgence/taxtimeline.htm.
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Basic Model Description
On January 1, 1961, an investor in the highest tax bracket invested $100 into a portfolio of stocks representing the S&P 500 Index. The dividend yield that year was 3.41% paid quarterly of 0.8525%. The Index rose 23.13%, and its assumed straight line growth over the year would have priced it at $105. 78, $111.56, $117.34, and $123.13 at the end of each quarter. Dividend yield of 0.8525% on each of those exhibits give $0.90, $0.95, $1.00, and $1.05 totaling $3.90. The dividend tax in 1960 was 91% and state tax which can be adjusted in the model was assumed to be an additional 6% so the $3.90 after taxes would be only $0.12.
During the year, there was a 20% portfolio turnover resulting in capital gains tax of $4.63 on market appreciation of $23.13. This was taxed at 25% federal and 6% state so at year end, $1.43 was owed in taxes. Combining the $100 original portfolio value plus the $23.13 in gains, less $1.43 for taxes and adding $0.12 more in dividends, the total portfolio at the end of the year is $121.81
The retained dividends and turnover after taxes in the portfolio will then be reinvested which will add to the original $100 principal. The $4.63 in turnover, less taxes of $1.43, nets $3.19 (rounded) plus $0.12 in dividends. This means that the principal to begin the next year will be $100 + $3.19 + $0.12 = $103.31. The 20% turnover in the following year will now have to pay capital gains tax on any amount over that exhibit. Since we are only turning over 20% of the portfolio, the actual exhibit to be used will be $103.31 * 20% = $20.67
The After a significant downturn of the market in both 1973 and 1974, the principal which had been stepped-up over the past several years was actually greater than the fmal value of the portfolio. In this case, no capital gains taxes were taken out of the portfolio because there was actually a loss. Furthermore, there needed to be a tax credit given for the S3.65 in losses realized in this year. This credit was given in the following year on the growth, as stated by the tax code; however it took a total of five years to use up all of the tax credit because the portfolio dipped so low. This decreases total return for the investor because the credit is given in the dollar value of the tax loss, not growing •with the market until an equal tax gain is realized. The current value of the tax credit can be seen in the hidden "O" column in the model. Principal afi:er step-up = ($-8.58 -*3.65*(not included)) = $-8.58 + $1.12 + 152.15 = $144.69
As you can see, the tax credit was not included as usual in the above calculation because of the loss. Notice the lowering of the principal because after the turnover, the investor did not have as much money to reinvest in the portfolio, hence the "step-down".
In 1975, there were not enough gains to use up aU of the tax credit and only $0.04 was taken away from $3.65:
Principal after step-up = ($4.56 -$1.44*(after credit)) = $3.12 + $2.25 + $158.58 = $163.95 (rounded) Current Credit = -$3.65 + $0.04 + $2.43 + $0.23 + $0.34+ $2.05 = $1.44
Liquidation Value
On January 1, 2005, the portfoho has a fmal value of $1,807.00 yielding an annual average return of 6.80% on the portfolio. However, for this investor to be able to put this money to some use other than investing, he would need to pay a capital gains tax on any gains in the portfolio above the adjusted principal. Because of the current tax environment, less would be lost to taxes than at any other time before 2004 especially compared to the average over the time period studied of 27% federal + 6% state = 33%. Currently, the tax loss would only be 15% federal + 6% state.
To calculate the annual return on the portfolio after liquidation:
Final portfolio value of $1,807.00 -$1,533.75 principal = $273.25 taxed @ 21% = $57.38
Value after liquidation = $1,807.00-$57.38 = $1749.62 ROR = (($l,807.00/$100) ^ (1/44)) -1 = 6.72% One thing to be noted, if a different scenario was run with liquidation coming in a year with a tax credit, that value must be added to fmal principal before the tax is taken out.
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